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LEE HARRIS: AL-QAEDA’S FANTASY IDEOLOGY
STUDY GUIDE, 2009
Steven Alan Samson
Study Questions
1.

How does a misplaced sympathy for the enemy contribute to a failure of imagination? Was 9-11
a crime, a tragedy, an act of war, an accident, or what? How we choose to define reality is of
great importance. What assumption about 9-11 did Victor Davis Hanson (the military historian,
classicist, and author of Carnage and Culture) share with Noam Chomsky (the language theorist
and Blame America First polemicist)? What is the nature of war as viewed by the Prussian
strategist Clausewitz?

2.

“A Personal Recollection” might best be read in light of Kenneth Minogue’s remarks about
political stage-acting in “Why Despots Don’t Being in Politics.” What Harris calls a fantasy
ideology resembles Plato’s tyrannical soul as described in The Republic, Book 8. For a
humorous look at a fantasy life, see James Thurber’s The Secret Life of Walter Mitty. Fantasy
ideologies can be usefully analyzed in light of René Girard’s theory of mimetic desire, as Girard
himself did with Don Quixote by Miguel de Cervantes. Jane Austen’s Sense and Sensibility is
another study of fantasy (especially the “sensibility” part). A very striking examination of the role
of fantasy in the career of a tyrant may be found in Ibsen and Hitler by Steven Sage. Our whole
celebrity culture and its fixation on glamour (however that may be defined) is a testimony to the
power of fantasy.

3.

That last sentence naturally leads to a question Harris raises: “But what happens when it is not an
individual who is caught up in his fantasy world, but an entire group—a sect, or a people, or even
a nation?” What are chiliastic (derived from the Grek for thousand years; millennial is the Latinderived equivalent) movements? James Billington’s Fire in the Minds of Men (the title itself
evokes revolutionary fantasies of French and German freemasons) is a massive history of Leftwing secular millenarianism from the French Revolution to the Russian Revolution. Erik von
Kuehnelt-Leddihn’s Leftism is also very good for displaying the personal foibles and outright
madness of prominent Left-wing thinkers and activists from the French Revolution forward. See
also Norman Cohn’s The Pursuit of the Millennium. Eric Voegelin singles out the three ages of
the medieval heretic Joachim of Fiore (who influenced Dante) as the epitome of the Gnostic
mentality.

4.

What causes “a preexisting collective need” for a particular fantasy? What are some of the
classic examples? If you wish to analyze the collective need aspect, the opening chapter of The
Abolition of Britain by Peter Hitchens, which contrasts the funerals of Winston Churchill and
Princess Diana, is a good place to start. The funeral obsequies for Michael Jackson evoked
nothing so much as the life, death, and exaltation of Princess Diana. A film that deals with the
power of popular legend is The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance. In 1840 Thomas Carlyle
published his popular lectures On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History, identified
different types of heroes and featuring Mohammed, Luther, Rousseau, Napoleon, and other
examples. All of these charismatic figures continue to fascinate. Beethoven broke new musical
ground with his third symphony. Originally inspired by Napoleon, Beethoven tore up the original
title (Napoleon Symphony) in a rage after his clay-footed hero crowned himself emperor and
substituted the name Eroica [Heroic]. The Kansas historian James C. Malin, who probably had
his fill of the great man school of history, once wrote a book with the wonderful title Confounded
Rot About Napoleon. As an illustration of the Romantic hero-fantasy, the apotheosis of Abraham
Lincoln at the time of his death and the practice of “waving the bloody shirt” (in fact a whole series
of shirts) following his assassination proved to be very powerful tools for the many faceted reimaging of America that has continued through the Progressive movement, New Deal liberalism,

the New Frontier (with its own “bloody shirt”), and the Great Society to the present day.
5.

Why is the “theme of reviving ancient glory” an important key to understanding bloody-minded
fantasy ideologies? How does this theme help us to understand various national, ideological, and
sectarian pathologies, such as the Dolchstoss (back-stab) myth among Germans following the
First World War, the martyrology of the Shiite Muslims and other defeated sects, and the cultural
threnody of conquered peoples and lost causes. Pride may be displayed as open contempt by
victors and rebels alike. And just as equally and maliciously, it may be cloaked in bitter
resentment by the victims (Friedrich Nietzsche’s and Max Scheler’s Ressentiment). That is why,
as Roger Scruton notes, the virtues of forgiveness and irony are so important to the vitality of
civilization. Such an understanding is especially important today since, as a young veteran of
wars in India and Sudan understood in 1901: “The wars of peoples will be more terrible
than those of kings" (Winston Churchiill). A useful study is Fritz Stern’s The Politics of
Cultural Despair. Osama bin Laden invokes the golden age of the thousand year caliphate while
the mullahs of Iran invoke the 7C martyrdom of Ali and his son Hussein, whose shrines are at
Najaf and Karbala in Iraq, and anticipate the advent of the Hidden Imam.

6.

What does Harris mean by transformative belief? In Theses on Feuerbach, young Karl Marx
(one of the Young Hegelians) wrote "The philosophers have merely interpreted the world in
various ways; the point, however, is to change it." The impetus may be make-believe but
transformative leaders often bring such make-believe into reality. Note Budziszewski on the
subversion and conversion of the conscience through its capture by sin. In writing about “the will
to believe,” William James discerned a practical way of implementing his pragmatic
understanding of belief in his famous essay “The Moral Equivalent of War,” which later inspired
the teaching career of Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy (Planetary Service) and the Civilian
Conservation Corps in the 1930s. How does Harris use the concept of “the irrational?” A classic
on the subject is The Greeks and the Irrational by E. R. Dodds. How did Georges Sorel take this
concept of the will to believe and convert it into an active, myth-making force (“artificially
inseminated” beliefs)? Think of Budziszewski, again, on conscience as an active force rather
than a passive barrier. How were the initiatives of Sorel and Vilfredo Pareto (two of the subjects
of James Burnham’s The Machiavellians) applied by Benito Mussolini (who was himself named
after an earlier revolutionary)? Harris also makes a passing reference here to the influential
artistic movement of that period known as Futurism.

7.

Mussolini was a classic political entrepreneur: “For the Sorelian myth to achieve its effect it had
to be presented as theater.” This is yet another exercise in the idyllic imagination and an
example of its modulated into the diabolic imagination, much as the “democratic soul in Plato’s
The Republic is transformed into the “tyrannical soul.” Samuel Taylor Coleridge wrote that the
“poetic faith” (another literary application of mimetic desire) transfers “from our inward nature a
human interest and a semblance of truth sufficient to procure for these shadows of imagination
that willing suspension of disbelief for the moment.” Given his ambitions to revive “the grandeur
that was Rome” (Edgar Allan Poe’s phrase), why, as Harris sees it, did Mussolini choose to
invade Ethiopia? Romanticized fantasies abound wherever we choose to look.

8.

What is it like to be a prop in someone else’s fantasy? Ask the “beautiful people” and others who
live in the public eye (or in the “evil eye” of obsessive voyeurs) and who live with this reality
constantly. The stalker is the stock motivator of so many films in the action, drama, cartoon, and
horror genres. Envious or covetous hatred is also one of the themes of Roger Scruton’s The
West and the Rest and his analysis of both radical Islam and the culture of repudiation. René
Girard’s linking of such scapegoating with his mimetic theory is played out repeatedly on the
political and entertainment stages like a broken vinyl record. Should we wait with baited breath to
see who will be the next victim? John Donne’s reply is bleak: “[S]end not to know For whom the
bell tolls. It tolls for thee.” Anti-Semitism and anti-Americanism are two such obsessive mental
derangements that play out on the larger historical stage. Who does Harris believe was the
intended audience for the exercise in revolutionary theater and agitprop that we remember as 911? We need to understand (as the Soviet dissident Igor Shafarevich understood about

socialism) that radical Islam is a death cult: “Seen through the distorting prism of radical Islam,
the act of suicide is transformed into that of martyrdom—martyrdom in all its transcendent glory
and accompanied by the panoply of magical powers that religious tradition has always assigned
to martyrdom.”
9.

Why was there so much uncertainty and misunderstanding about al-Qaeda’s goals in the weeks
and months following 9-11? The media, of course, could be depended upon to “amplify even the
least act of terrorism into a continuing saga of national nightmare,” in ways very similar to what
had done earlier with the Kennedy assassination (the book to read is James Piereson’s Camelot
and the Cultural Revolution), the Vietnam War, Watergate, the Iran hostage crisis, and countless
other incidents. The news has become our 24/7 soap opera. Ever since such 19C studies of
crowd psychology as Charles Mackay’s Extraordinary Delusions and the Madness of Crowds and
Gustave LeBon’s The Crowd, studies of social psychology have contributed not only to our
knowledge of collective behavior but also to what William H. Riker called The Art of Political
Manipulation. Edward Bernays, the nephew of Sigmund Freud who worked as an American
propagandist during WWI, became a principal figure in selling the New Deal in the 1930s. As
Marvin Olasky noted in The American Leadership Tradition: “Bernays, believing that there is ‘no
being in the air to watch over us,’ argued that public relations counselors earn their pay ‘by
making the public believe that human gods are watching over us for our own benefit’” (p. 204).
As a consequence, so it seems, politics has become a whirlwind of fantasy images with the
political demigods hurling thunderbolts at each other for our edification and entertainment, as well
as our fear and trepidation at times. The psychology of collective decision-making is explored in
Graham T. Allison’s classic “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis” and Irving Janis’s
Victims of Groupthink about American foreign policy fiascoes.

10.

What does Harris believe to have been al-Qaeda’s real objective? Here he invokes something
akin to the old crime story device in Sherlock Holmes of the dog that did not bark. The question
he asks is: Why did al-Qaeda not pursue its strategic advantage as should be expected under the
Clausewitzian formula?

11.

What consequences flow from Harris’s thesis? In real terms, the question is: “Are We at War?”
What did Ernst Nolte observe about the rise of both Mussolini and Hitler? What are some of the
“serious repercussions” involved in “fighting with an enemy who is not engaged in Clausewitzian
warfare? What kind of “magic bullet” might appeal to someone, like Osama bin Laden or Kim
Jong Il or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who is captivated by “magical thinking?” How did President
Bush regard the 9-11 attack? Why does Harris praise his use of the term “evildoer?” Why then
should we retire the war metaphor? What would Harris put in its place? Harris advises using
other metaphors—parasite, poison, cancer—to describe the threat. He regards fantasy
ideologies as plagues or diseases that require appropriate public health protections and
procedures. But in the end, given the nature of identity politics in a pluralistic welfare state, the
problem with this metaphor is that some “politically correct” social pathologies enjoy political
immunity even from such reasonable public health measures as screening and quarantining.
Thus it must come down finally to the patient’s—that is, America’s and the West’s—will to live,
about which Alexander Solzhenitsyn expressed grave doubts at Harvard in 1978.
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